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telecommunications policy. As 
a tool of conflict, it facilitates 
all types of clashes, from street 
protests that are coordinated and 
promoted via websites and social 
media to state-on-state wars that 
rely on cyberspace to transmit in-
formation to the warfighter and 
coordinate military operations. 
As a target of conflict, its ele-
ments are subject to cyberattacks 
in support of state and nonstate 
battles. The articles in this special 
issue address this third area, with 
an emphasis on cyberattacks as an 
instrument of warfare, or what 
we refer to as cyberwarfare.
A New Battlefield
Cyberattacks have been a part of 
conflict for more than two de-
cades. Early examples include 
•	 the WANK worm, which infil-
trated NASA’s network in 1989 
in protest of nuclear weapons 
and NASA’s use of radioactive 
plutonium to fuel the Galileo 
probe’s booster system;
•	Strano Network’s one-hour 
“netstrike” against French gov-
ernment websites in 1995 to 
protest French government poli-
cies on nuclear and social issues;
•	 the Electronic Disturbance The-
atre’s “Web sit-ins” against web-
sites in Mexico, the US, and 
elsewhere starting in 1998 to 
support the Mexican Zapatistas, 
and later other political and so-
cial causes; 
•	 the Internet Black Tigers’ “sui-
cide email bombings” against 
Sri Lankan embassies to counter 
government electronic propa-
ganda; and
•	Web defacements by Team 
Spl0it and other antiwar hackers 
calling for an end to the Kosovo 
conflict in 1999.
None of these were perpetrated 
by governments or tied to state-
level conflicts. Rather, they were 
perpetrated by nonstate groups 
clashing with their own and inter-
national governments. 
By the late 1990s, state-on-state 
conflict triggered many cyber-
attacks, though the acts themselves 
were conducted by nonstate ac-
tors. Patriotic hackers aimed their 
cyberattacks against foreign coun-
tries to support their own. Some of 
the cyber attacks 
during the Ko-
sovo era were of 
that nature. For 
example, Serbi-
an Black Hand 
hack ers attacked 
the military com-
puters of NATO 
countries, and 
Chinese hack-
ers defaced US websites after their 
embassy in Belgrade was acci-
dently destroyed by US airstrikes. 
The conflict was characterized as 
the first war on the Internet, in 
recognition of not only the cyber-
attacks but also the broader role 
played by the Internet, especially 
in the dissemination of informa-
tion about the conflict.
Chinese hackers have been es-
pecially inclined toward patriotic 
hacking. Known as the Red Hack-
er Alliance or the Honker Union 
of China, they published a mani-
festo that expressed their patriotic 
mission and included Mao Zedong 
quotes. Their cyber attacks targets 
have included
•	 Indonesia in 1998 over the treat-
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ment of Chinese living in Jakarta;
•	 the US in 1999 after the Bel-
grade embassy bombing, and in 
2001 following the death of a 
Chinese F-8 fighter pilot whose 
jet collided with a US EP-3 re-
connaissance plane;
•	Taiwan in 1999 following Tai-
wanese President Li Deng-Hui’s 
advocacy for a “two-state theo-
ry,” and in 2000 in conjunction 
with Taiwanese elections;
•	 Japan in 2000 over its handling 
of the Nanjing Massacre during 
WWII, and in 2004 over the 
disputed Diaoyu Islands; and
•	 Iran in 2010 in retaliation for the 
Iranian Cyber Army hijacking 
China’s search engine, Baidu.
Many of these became two-way 
“hacker wars” between the Chi-
nese hackers and their counter-
parts in other countries.
Russia has also been home to a 
contingent of patriot hackers. This 
was especially evident in 2007, 
when Estonia was hit by mas-
sive denial-of-service attacks over 
the controversial relocation of a 
Soviet- era war memorial, and in 
2008, when Georgia was the tar-
get of similar attacks in conjunc-
tion with a ground confrontation 
with Russian troops. Russian 
hackers were also implicated for 
Web defacements during the 1999 
Kosovo conflict and for various 
cyber attacks against Israel, the 
Ukraine, Lithuania, Chechnya, 
Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, and others 
during the past decade.
In This Issue
The Russian government has dis-
avowed playing a role in any of 
these attacks. But even if it didn’t 
plan or execute them, it might 
have encouraged or facilitated 
them, or at least turned a blind eye. 
The possibility of any government 
using its patriotic hackers as a kind 
of cybermilitia raises numerous is-
sues related to the conduct of states 
and cyberwarfare.
This brings us to the first ar-
ticle of this special issue, “Cyber-
militias and Political Hackers: Use 
of Irregular Forces in Cyberwar-
fare” by Scott D. Applegate, a US 
Army major. The article examines 
the implications of cybermilitias, 
whether explicitly controlled by 
their states or operating more or 
less independently. It addresses 
such issues as how these groups 
should be treated under interna-
tional law, whether their activities 
violate the Law of Armed Con-
flict, patriotic hackers’ combatant 
status, the extent to which states 
can control cybermilitias, and 
the problem of attributing cyber-
attacks. Applegate makes the im-
portant observation that, because 
of these issues, states might prefer 
to covertly leverage cybermilitias 
rather than openly conduct cyber-
warfare with conventional forces.
Although nonstate actors ap-
pear to be responsible for most of 
the conflict-related cyberattacks 
that have been reported publicly, a 
few incidents are generally regard-
ed as the work of states:
•	After the KGB tried to infil-
trate a Canadian company and 
steal software for controlling 
the Soviet’s Trans-Siberian gas 
pipeline, the US planted a logic 
bomb in the code; the malware is 
thought to be responsible for the 
1982 pipeline explosion. 
•	 Israel purportedly used a cyber-
attack to disable Syrian air de-
fenses prior to launching an 
airstrike against Syrian nuclear 
facilities in 2007.
•	 In 2010, the Stuxnet worm re-
portedly damaged centrifuges 
at Iran’s nuclear enrichment fa-
cility at Natanz. Although we 
don’t know the attack source, 
the level of sophistication sug-
gests a nation- state. Israel, the 
US, China, and Russia have all 
been named as possibilities. 
The second article, “Cyberwar 
Thresholds and Effects” by James 
A. Lewis, senior fellow and direc-
tor of the Technology and Public 
Policy Program at the Center for 
Strategic and International Stud-
ies, addresses difficult questions 
relating to nation-states’ use of 
cyberspace as an instrument of 
armed conflict. Lewis examines 
the advantages and disadvantages 
of using cyberweapons, condi-
tions under which cyberattacks 
are likely to be of value, scenarios 
for cyberwar, applicability of the 
international Laws of War and 
Armed Conflict, and thresholds 
for when a cyberevent becomes 
an act of war and use of force. 
More than 100 countries are re-
portedly developing capabilities 
for cyberespionage and cyber-
attack, so Lewis’s article offers a 
timely analysis of just how and 
when those capabilities might be 
used to advantage.
The third article, “Principles 
of Cyberwarfare” by Raymond 
C. Parks and David P. Duggan 
of Sandia National Laboratories, 
offers principles for successfully 
conducting cyberwarfare. After 
examining whether long-held 
principles of warfare such as objec-
tive, mass, unity of command, and 
surprise extend to cyber warfare, 
the authors present eight addi-
tional principles that are unique 
to the domain. The principles, 
which were derived from years 
of conducting red-team exercises 
equivalent to limited cyberwarfare 
scenarios, are offered as a starting 
point for discussion and dialogue.
The fourth and last article, 
“Deterring Strategic Cyber-
attack,” is by David Elliott, an 
affiliate of Stanford University’s 
Freeman Spogli Institute for In-
ternational Studies and the Cen-
ter for International Security and 
Cooperation. Rather than ana-
lyzing cyberwarfare’s conduct or 
benefits, Elliott focuses on its de-
terrence, in particular, whether 
cyberattacks against essentially 
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civilian national infrastructure 
can be strategically deterred. He 
approaches the question by ex-
amining the elements of nuclear 
deterrence to ascertain their rel-
evance to cyberdeterrence. After 
showing that the elements don’t 
transfer, he offers deterrence by 
denial as the best solution.
T hese articles offer a fairly com-prehensive introduction to the 
topic of cyberwarfare, particularly 
its policy and legal aspects. For 
readers interested in digging deeper 
and being exposed to other views, 
we offer the following suggestions.
The National Research Coun-
cil has two excellent reports 
relating to cyberwarfare. The 
first—Technology, Policy, Law, and 
Ethics Regarding US Acquisition and 
Use of Cyberattack Capabilities—is a 
report from the NRC Committee 
on Offensive Information War-
fare.1 It addresses issues relating 
to the US employing cyberwar-
fare, particularly cyber attack. The 
second—Proceedings of a Workshop 
on Deterring Cyberattacks: Informing 
Strategies and Developing Options for 
US Policy—is a collection of pa-
pers commissioned by the NRC 
and presented at a public work-
shop.2 The papers offer a different 
perspective on topics discussed in 
this special issue, including cy-
berattacks’ nature and conduct, 
cyberwarfare in international law, 
and cyberdeterrence. 
The book Cyber War by Richard 
A. Clarke and Robert K. Knake 
offers an engaging and provocative 
look at cyberwarfare.3 It includes 
a discussion of cyber incidents at-
tributed to states, proposals for bet-
ter defending against cyberattack 
threats, cyberwarfare strategies, 
and cyberpeace prospects.
Readers interested in origi-
nal thinking on cyberwarfare 
are referred to the prescient pa-
per by John Arquilla and David 
Ronfeldt called “Cyberwar Is 
Coming!”4 In addition to intro-
ducing the term and concept of 
“cyberwar,” the authors intro-
duced “netwar,” which involves 
information-related struggles as-
sociated with nonstate actors or-
ganized as networks.
Finally, cyberconflict at the 
nonstate level is discussed in greater 
depth in Dorothy Denning’s paper, 
“Cyber Conflict as an Emergent 
Social Phenomenon.”5 The paper 
discusses hacktivism, electronic 
jihad, and patriotic hacking, and 
covers most of the examples men-
tioned earlier in this introduction 
along with many others. 
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